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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT L. JOSEPH,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 20050979-CA
DAVID L. McCANN, M.D., F.A.P.A.,
Defendant and Appellee.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
This is an appeal of a trial court's grant of summary judgment and post-judgment refusal
to alter or amend judgment on the bases of "duty" and statute of limitations disputes in a medical
malpractice action Robert Joseph, a former Salt Lake City Police Officer, filed against David L.
McCann, M.D., F.A.P.A. In response to Joseph's issues raised in briefing on appeal, Dr.
McCann has presented new matters to this Court which requires a reply brief. The arguments of
Dr. McCann calls for the application of the principle of statutory construction EXPRESSIO
UNIUS ESTEXCLUSIO ALTERIUS which means "the inclusion of specific things implies the
exclusion of other not mentioned." Dr. McCann's response also requires arguments concerning
the parties' pleadings wherein Dr. McCann's Answer demonstrates that he did not deny acting

fraudulent, in that he only denied acting negligently. And finally, in light of the doctor's
argument and failure to plead a denial of fraudulent acts, Joseph is required to address the issue
of "equitable tolling," in that it is well-settled that the doctrine "is grounded in the fraudulent
concealment of the harm gives rise to the right to sue," and provides that the limitations period
does not begin to run "until the fraud is or should have been discovered." See Holmberg v.
Armbrecht 327 U.S. 392, 397, 66 S. Ct. 582, 90 L. Ed. 743 (1946) ("And so this Court long ago
adopted as its own old chancery rule that where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and 'remains
in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute
does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or
efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other
party.'" (citations omitted).
On appeal is the question that can a claimant present a fraud cause of action after a
previous negligence claim was time-barred when it was discovered after litigation commenced
that the doctor had fraudulently concealed his tortuous misconduct. In this matter, the doctor's
conduct was concealed that he was retained by SLC to act as an "expert witness" for SLC against
Joseph in the former employers' scheme to discharge the officer. The second question before the
Court is, does the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (UHCMA), § 78-14-1 et seq. create a duty
for an admitted health care provider who while claiming to be an independent medical examiner,
but who in this case, specifically and expressly identified Joseph as his patient, who was acting
under a contract to perform a specific act involving the forensic psychiatric evaluation and fitness
of the Plaintiff. The forensic psychiatric service provided was similar to others relating to or
arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons and officers, employees, or agents

2

of any of the above acting in the course and scope of their employment. Nothing within the
UHCMA Act or Dr. McCann's own contract can be read to imply that McCann's service to
determine Joseph's fitness was excluded from regulation under the UHCMA. Moreover, nothing
in the Act implies that exclusion of application for acts of dishonesty, conspiracy or deceit will
ever be immune. The Act can only be read to cover the situation herein, not exclude them. The
first words of the definition of "health care" are "Any act. . . ."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Dr. McCann on page 3 of his Brief of Appellee contradicted the factual record when he
stated "After discovery, Dr. McCann moved for summary judgment on two alternative grounds:
(1) that as an independent medical evaluator, he had no physician-patient relationship with
Plaintiff, and hence, no duty of care to support a claim of malpractice . . . ." The factual record
included the contract, (R. at 128), presented by Dr. McCann and signed by Mr. Joseph, expressly
called Mr. Joseph a "patient" and it is undisputable that Dr. McCann's is expressly described as
the doctor within that same contract. Moreover, Dr. McCann and the contract refers to Utah
Code Annotated 78-25-25, which is also an admission of rights of Mr. Joseph and is an
acknowledgment that Dr. McCann is a "health care provider."
Dr. McCann on page 10 of his Brief of Appellee admits the authority of Utah Law, the
UHCMA conceded Mr. Joseph's claim that Dr. McCann owed a duty. Dr. McCann claimed that
"the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, which defines 'health care' as 'any act or treatment
performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the
patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement.' Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(10)(Supp. 2005)."
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The definition of "health care" does fit in the case of Mr. Joseph. Dr. McCann's contracted
service to evaluate Mr. Joseph's fitness for duty that as his "patient" he was required to sign is an
"act. . . performed or furnished, by [Dr. McCann, a] health care provider for, to, or on behalf of
[an admitted] patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement."

ARGUMENTS
POINT ONE.
THE PRINCIPLE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST
EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS APPLIES IN THIS MATTER.
In McCann's Point One, McCann argues that in his situation he was not a physician and
that Mr. Joseph was not a patient and he owed no duty to Joseph because "no duty was owed."
The principle of statutory construction EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS which
means "the inclusion of specific things implies the exclusion of other not mentioned" applies in
this matter. Dr. McCann argues that his conduct in this matter is excepted from regulation in the
UHCMA Act. The argument is not derived from the Act although. His only source is case law
from other jurisdictions where the UHCMA Act does not control. His argument also originates
from his own selfish proclamations that he acted as an "Independent Medical Examiner." I n
actuality he was acting as the City's expert witness for litigation purposes even though there was
no litigation.
Dr. McCann's briefing argues DIRECTLY against controlling law, the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act (UHCMA). By using out of state authority alone, Dr. McCann argues for an
exception to the State's regulation of him and his conduct through the formation of an exception
for when a physician is acting as an alleged "Independent Medical Examiner." He's asking the
4

Courts to legislate from the bench. Without waiving his previous arguments in the original Brief
on appeal, Mr. Joseph's adds in defense to McCann the application of the principle of statutory
construction EXPRESSIO UNIUSESTEXCLUSIO ALTERIUS which means "the inclusion of
specific things implies the exclusion of other not mentioned." Black's Law Dictionary 521 (5th
ed. 1979). See Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 857 P.2d 922 (Utah 1993). But this principle
is only an aid to statutory interpretation; it is not a rule of law, and it has only limited application.
Id, 924; also Rio Grande Motor Way. Inc. v. Public Serv. Common, 445 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah
1968). A court's primary responsibility in interpreting a statute "is to give effect to the intent of
the legislature," American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984), and rules of
statutory interpretation exist only to assist in this determination. IdL; Stone v. Superior Court, 31
Cal.3d 503, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 659 n. 10, 646 P.2d 809, 821 n. 10 (1982). The inclusion of
specific matter in a statute implies the exclusion of something else '"only where in the natural
association of ideas the contrast between a specific subject matter which is expressed and one
which is not mentioned leads to an inference that the latter was not intended to be included
within the statute.' 82 CJ.S. Statutes § 333, at 670 (1953)." Id, at 924.
The UHCMA is a Legislative creation, the issue Dr. McCann raises is nonjusticable in
the Courts. Had the Legislature intended an exception for times when the physician was acting
as an IME, the Legislature could have included that exception within the UHCMA Act.
However, the Legislature chose not to. By Dr. McCann's own admission on his page 10 of
Appellee's Brief on appeal, the definition of "health care" provides, 'any act or treatment
performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the
patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement.' Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(10)(Supp. 2005)."
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(emphasis added). Mr. Joseph fits squarely within the definition here. The doctor's contract (R.
at 128) expressly calls Mr. Joseph Dr. McCann's "patient." The only thing excluded in the
contract expressly is that Dr. McCann was not treating Mr. Joseph. Nothing else about the
contract can be interpreted against Mr. Joseph otherwise. During Mr. Joseph's evaluation he was
confined and cannot be disputed by Dr. McCann that he was performing a medical care service
just as any other health care provider would within the same degree of learning, care and skill
possessed practicing in the same medical field. In this case, the field of forensic psychology.
The United States Supreme Court offers direction here on this issue. That Court's
position is "If Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it
created, there is an end of the matter. The Congressional statute of limitation is definitive."
Holmberg v. Armbrecht 327 U.S. 392, 395, 66 S. Ct. 582, 90 L. Ed. 743 (1946) (citation
omitted). Therefore, the matter before this Court even concerning the interpretation of the statute
of limitations and whether to except a duty a health care provider owes to a patient when he is
alleging "no loyalties" must stem from the Legislature's UHCMA Act, itself. In this matter, Dr.
McCann argues for the exclusion of IMEs as distinguished from other forms of services health
care providers provide their patients when performing forensic psychological reports. Also
where the statute of limitations as in this matter provides a "not more than four years" statute of
limitations, including discovery of fraudulent concealment within one year, this Court must
conclude that the issues are definitive from the statute consistent with the intent of the
Legislature. Clearly Mr. Joseph's interpretations and not Dr. McCann's are consistent with the
UHCMA Act as intended by the Legislature.
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POINT TWO.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS DEFINITIVE WHERE THE LEGISLATURE
HAS PROVIDED A FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT PROVISION.
In McCann's Point Two, McCann argues that in his situation, Joseph was not entitled to
the tolling provision 78-14-4(l)(b) for fraud. However, well-settled case law concerning the
issue of "equitable tolling" favors Mr. Joseph in that the doctrine "is grounded in the fraudulent
concealment of the harm gives rise to the right to sue," and provides that the limitations period
does not begin to run "until the fraud is or should have been discovered." Aldrich v. McCulloch
Properties. Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1043 n.7 (10th Cir. 1980); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d
1233, 1240 (8th Cir.), cert, den., 400 U.S. 852, 27 L. Ed. 2d 90, 91 S. Ct. 47 (1970). In this
matter, Dr. McCann concealed from Mr. Joseph the true origin and intent of his evaluation - that
he was acting as Salt Lake City's expert witness for litigation purposes, even though no litigation
had commenced and that he intended an adverse report despite claiming "independence."
Moreover, Dr. McCann concealed letters about Mr. Joseph and he lied about his communications
with others that never took place. (See Creswell's letter with alleged attachments and David
Greer's deposition testimony).
In this matter, Dr. McCann futile defense of Mr. Joseph's fraudulent concealment claim
argues that Joseph should have known about the fraud just because he previously had claimed
negligence in front of the Civil Service Commission.1 In support of that argument, McCann
1

However, McCann provides nothing to the Court to show that Joseph should have known
he was the victim of a McCann's fraud. The City never told him. What source of the discovery does
McCann suggest, since he himself lied to Joseph about "independence" and because Creswell's
"confidential" letter (McCann's origins) had been concealed from him by both the City and
McCann?
7

raised a new argument of appeal claiming no exception for fraudulent concealment is present
because the Lyn Creswell letter did not directly relate to the allegations addressed in Mr. Joseph
Complaint, paragraphs 39, 40, 48, and 50. The doctor claims that "Having done nothing more
than (arguably) support fraud allegations that plaintiff had made in his complaint, the Creswell
letter does not operate to make those allegations timely under the two-year limitations period of §
78-14-4(1), nor under the 'fraudulent concealment' exception of subsection 78-14-4(l)(b)." The
argument of McCann is farthest from true. The Creswell letter directly evidences concealment
on the part of McCann. McCann's evaluation of Mr. Joseph identifies the information he relied
on to form his opinion. However, McCann deliberately avoided identifying that document when
he issued his psychological report on February 28, 2000, just because the letter was marked
"confidential."
Moreover, McCann suggests that was the extent of Mr. Joseph's claims. It is not,
McCann also was fraudulent in his discussions with Joseph and in the presentation of his contract
(R. at 128), wherein Mr. Joseph was led to believe that the evaluation was independent, meaning
there was no bias for or against Joseph or for or against Salt Lake City. The truth is then, as
admitted to the trial court below, McCann was hired by the City with the intentions of acting as
the City Expert Witness for litigation purposes. This fact was also concealed from Mr. Joseph
and that the representation McCann would be acting independently is nothing less than
fraudulent. (R. at 92). McCann's disclosure that he was hired to act as the City' expert was not
made known to Joseph until deeper into litigation than McCann's previous revelation of the plan
set up by the Lyn Creswell letter in "confidentiality" during discovery. The disclosure of acting
as the City's expert was not made known until the filing for summary judgment on June 7, 2004.
8

In McCann's Brief, pages 17-18, McCann emphasizes certain allegations pled in Joseph's
Complaint. This effort is done for the first time, while on appeal. In defense of said arguments,
Mr. Joseph raises herein that McCann never properly opposed the allegations in his Answer.
Pursuant to Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil Procedures,2 if an allegation is not denied, the allegation
generally is deemed admitted and the pleadings as to those allegations are closed. Given the fact
that Joseph alleged facts, if admitted, prove plaintiffs prima facie case, Joseph concludes that
such admissions thus place no burden upon him to prove the case factually. Burlington Northern
Railroad Co. v. Huddleston. 94 F.3d 1413 (10th Cir. 1996). In Defendant's Answer, (Addendum
A, attached) Dr. McCann did not deny acting fraudulently or in conspiracy with the City despite
the accusation in Joseph's Complaint. In stead, Defendant merely denied acting negligently
only. (See Answer, ^ 13). (R. at 18).
McCann attempts to build his argument tying in a new argument raised first time on
appeal using Plaintiffs Complaint attempting to demonstrate that the Creswell letter is not direct
evidence of fraudulent concealment. That argument still fails however to adequately controvert
Joseph's issues on appeal. In a comparison of the Complaint with the McCann's Answer, the
only theory that McCann denied at that time was "negligence." (R. at 18). In Mr. Joseph's
allegations of his Complaint, (Appellee's Addendum A), Mr. Joseph alleged at paragraph 48:
[McCann] did not act objectively and misrepresented himself to [Joseph] as being an
independent medical examiner. [McCann] gained [Joseph]'s confidence during the
evaluation process by his deception.

2

Effect offailure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or
permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(d).
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Mr. Joseph alleged at paragraph 49:
[Joseph]'s confidence was gained through [McCann]'s fraudulent statements and
assurances of honesty of intentions and absence of malice.
Mr. Joseph alleged at paragraph 50:
In reality, [McCann] knowingly participated in the City's conspired scheme to deprive
Plaintiff Joseph of his employment. [McCann]'s role was voluntary and willful believing
he was immune from liability. [McCann] was wrong he is required to exercise the same
degree of learning, care and skill possessed by other in good standing practicing in the
same medical field.
Mr. Joseph alleged in paragraph 52:
[McCann] acted in a tortuous manner within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-143(32), 1953, as amended. He legal wrongs include libel, slander, conspiracy, negligence,
fraud and racketeering with the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (for obstructing justice in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512).
In McCann's Answer, (Addendum "A" hereto, at paragraph 13) (R. at 18), McCann only denies
acting "negligently." He stated:
13. Dr. McCann denies he was negligent or otherwise at fault in connection with his
dealings with [Joseph], including his testing, evaluation and completion of the IME
Report dated February 28, 2000, or that he is otherwise liable to [Joseph]
In other words, McCann by failing to deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 48, 49, 50 and
52, excepting for the "negligence" claim for which he did deny acting "negligently" McCann had
admitted acting tortuous against Joseph, fraudulently, in conspiracy and as a racketeer with the
City.
The standard for summary judgment is well-settled that the facts before the Court must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S.
10

317, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The nonmoving party in this matter was Joseph.
Nothing presented in the record, nor raised here on appeal justifies McCann's conduct. The facts
present before this Court requires the Court to remand the matter for trial. The parties can move
for a trial on the statute of limitations question separately pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-47
(1953, as amended) they can try the question simultaneously with the merits. Because the
standard is whether Joseph acted with reasonable diligence to discover the fraudulent
concealment ample evidence is before this Court to present the matter to a trier of fact. As a
matter of law, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-14-4, Joseph filed his lawsuit within the four year
statute of limitations and his filing was within one year of discovery of fraud, Joseph's claims
cannot as a matter of law be dismissed - what remains is a factual question for a jury. (See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-47 (1953, as amended). That is, unless the Court definitively forecloses the
question of statute of limitations here while on appeal one way or the other. See Reiser v.
Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) (The statute of limitations issue in a medical malpractice action
maybe disposed of by summary judgment if no genuine issues of material fact are raised);
Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987) ( Summary judgment, granted on the ground that
plaintiff failed to file the notice required in a medical malpractice action within the statutory
limitation period, was reversed where the facts were unclear and did not give rise to the
conclusion that, as a matter of law, plaintiff should have known of her legal injuries at the time
she suffered them). In this matter, McCann presents uncertain evidence that Joseph should have
known that McCann lied to him about his "independence," that he should have known he was
acting as the City's Expert Witness even though no litigation existed, and that he should have
been aware of McCann's receipt and concealment of the "confidential" Creswell letter, and that

li

McCann lied about speaking with David Greer, the president of the Police Association, when he
actually did not. As a matter of law, summary judgment should not have been granted. In stead,
the summary judgment was granted to permit this Court to address the "duty" question.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, summary judgment should be reversed and the matter
remanded consistent with the points raised in Joseph's original brief and for the reasons stated
herein. The Defendant, David L. McCann, M.D., F.A.P.A., by his own contract and consent
form and admissions expressed and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is without a legal
basis to claim "no duty' under the UHCMA Act and the Statute of Limitations issue 78-14-4 is a
question for a jury whether tried together with the merits of Joseph's claims or separately
pursuant to Section 78-12-47. McCann's invitation, however tempting it may be to distort the
UHCMA to permit an IME exception, the issue is nonjusticable, that is a proper matter for the
Legislature. The only time that an IME would not be regulated by the UHCMA is when he is
person not a health care provider, and in situations when the professional is a health care provider
is when his contract specifically informs the subject of the exam is that he IS NOT A PATIENT
and he specifically is informed no health care provider - patient relationship is established by the
contract. Moreover, since the UHCMA forbids fraudulent conduct, there can never be a waiver
for fraud claims. If the health care provider is fraudulent, there always has to be means of
redress. Immunity cannot be absolute when "fraud" is concerned.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of
May, 2006.

D. BRUCE OLIVER, L.L.C.

w

•>

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Appellant and Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 11th day of May, 2006,1 served a
copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the Appellee in
this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to
the following address: J. Anthony Eyre, KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C, 10 Exchange Place, 4th
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

ADDENDUM

J. ANTHONY EYRE - #1022
DAVID M. BERNSTEIN - # 8 3 0 1
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorney for David L. McCann, M.D.
Fourth Floor
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)521-3773
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

ROBERT L. JOSEPH, an individual,
ANSWER
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

DAVID L. McCANN, M.D., F.A.P.A.,
an individual,
Defendant.

Civil No. 030922636
Judge Judith Atherton

Defendant David L. McCann, M.D., F.A.P.A. ("Dr. McCann") answers the Complaint
of Robert L. Joseph as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
1.

Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim against Dr. McCann upon which

relief can be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
2.

Dr. McCann admits that the above-entitled Court has jurisdiction over the

case and the parties, and that venue is proper.
3.

Dr. McCann admits that Plaintiffs claim against him is brought pursuant to

the provisions of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, § 78-14-1, etseq., U.C.A.
4.

Dr. McCann admits that Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of

5.

Dr. McCann admits that he is now and was at all times referred to in Plaintiff's

Utah.

Complaint a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Utah, with a specialty
in the field of Psychiatry and conducts his practice in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
6.

Dr. McCann admits that during 1999, Plaintiff was employed by Salt Lake City

Corporation, Police Department as a Police Officer.
7.

Dr. McCann admits that on or about March 26, 1999, Plaintiff was involved

in an incident wherein he shot an individual who he had detained while acting under color
of authority as a Salt Lake City Corporation, Police Department Police Officer ("Shooting
Incident").
8.

Dr. McCann admits that as a result of Plaintiff's conduct in the Shooting

Incident, felony criminal charges were instituted against Plaintiff in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah by the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office. Dr. McCann
further admits that the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office ultimately did not resist
-2-

a Motion to Dismiss the criminal charges filed by Plaintiffs attorney, which was granted by
the Court. Dr. McCann denies Plaintiff was "cleared" of the Shooting Incident, and alleges
that after a full hearing on April 11, 2000 and May 8, 2000, the Civil Service Commission
in and for Salt Lake City, Utah entered the following Conclusions:
(a)

Joseph engaged in unprofessional conduct that put himself in a

position of danger.
(b)

Joseph used deadly force after all threat to him had passed.

(c)

Joseph shot at Scott's vehicle as it was moving away from him.

(d)

Joseph violated Police Policy 3-06-02.00 (Deadly Force).

(e)

Joseph violated Police Policy 3-06-05.02 (Firing at or from a Moving

Vehicle).
9.

Dr. McCann admits that in January 2000, Salt Lake City Corporation retained

him to perform an Independent Medical Evaluation ("IME") on Plaintiff and provided Dr.
McCann with employment-related materials regarding Plaintiff.
10.

Dr. McCann admits that during February 2000, he completed an IME on

Plaintiff, including testing and an interview on February 3, 2000.
11.

Dr. McCann admits that on February 28,2000, he completed his IME Report

on Plaintiff and provided the same to Salt Lake City Corporation.
12.

Dr. McCann admits that on March 31,2000, the Salt Lake City Corporation,

Police Department terminated Plaintiff as a Police Officer. Dr. McCann alleges that the
-3-

actions of the Salt Lake City Corporation, Police Department in terminating Plaintiff as a
Police Officer was affirmed by the Civil Service Commission in and for Salt Lake City, Utah
and later by the Utah Court of Appeals in Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Service, 53 P.3d
11 (Utah App. 2002).
13.

Dr. McCann denies he was negligent or otherwise at fault in connection with

his dealings with the Plaintiff, including his testing, evaluation and completion of the IME
Report dated February 28, 2000, or that he is otherwise liable to Plaintiff.
14.

Dr. McCann denies each and every other allegation against him contained

in Plaintiffs Complaint.
THIRD DEFENSE
15.

The damage claimed of by Plaintiff was a result of his negligence or other

16.

The damage claimed by Plaintiff was caused as a result of events and/or

fault.

conditions which were not the result of any negligence or other fault on the part of Dr.
McCann.
17.

The damage claimed by Plaintiff was caused as a result of the negligence or

other fault of parties other than Dr. McCann, and he is entitled to have the fault of all
parties assessed in accordance with the provisions of § 78-27-37 through § 78-27-43,
U.C.A.
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FOURTH DEFENSE
18.

Plaintiffs claim against Dr. McCann is subject to the provisions and limitations

of § 78-14-4.5, U.C.A.
19.

Plaintiffs claim against Dr. McCann is subject to the provisions and limitations

of § 78-14-7.1, U.C.A.
20.

Plaintiffs claim against Dr. McCann is subject to the provisions and limitations

of § 78-14-9.5, U.C.A.
FIFTH DEFENSE
21.

Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages against Dr. McCann is subject to the

provisions and limitations contained in § 78-18-1, etseq., U.C.A.
22.

Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages against Dr. McCann is restricted and/or

barred by the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution of the
United States.
SIXTH DEFENSE
23.

Plaintiffs claim against Dr. McCann is barred by the two-year statute of

limitations contained in § 78-14-4, U.C.A.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
24.

Evidence may disclose that Plaintiff has failed to mitigate damages.
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EIGHTH DEFENSE
25.

Plaintiff's claim against Dr. McCann is without merit and has not been

asserted in good faith, and Dr. McCann is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees in
connection with the action in accordance with the provisions of § 78-27-56, U.C.A.
WHEREFORE, Defendant David L. McCann, M.D., F.A.P.A. prays that Plaintiffs
Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, that he be awarded his attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in connection with the defense of the action, and such other relief as the Court
may deem proper.
DATED this / W"

day of November, 2003.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

). ANTHONY EYRE
'DAVID M. BERNSTEIN
Attorneys for David L. McCann1, M.D.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

of November, 2003, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Answer was served, via first-class mail, postage prepaid, upon the
following:
D. Bruce Oliver
Attorney for Plaintiff
Suite 210
180 South 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-149Q

1/MwO
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